Supreme Court Rules in Christian Mail-Carrier Case: Employers Must Accommodate Religious Practices

COMMENTARY: The unanimous vindication highlights how much Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination and the duty to accommodate religious practice are needed.

Gerald Groff
Gerald Groff (photo: Courtesy photo / First Liberty Institute)

At a time when our president and many of our nation’s lawmakers are hostile to traditional religious belief, this Supreme Court continues to reliably safeguard individual liberties and promote the common good. Take, for example, a decision issued at the end of the Court’s term by all the justices. 

Groff v. DeJoy involved a former mailman from rural Pennsylvania who is a Sabbatarian Christian and therefore unable to work on Sundays. He left his job because his work schedule did not accommodate his religious practices. The Supreme Court sent his case back to the lower court with clarifying instructions for considering whether accommodating Groff would constitute an “undue hardship.”  

Gerald Groff began work for the U.S. Postal Service when letters and packages weren’t delivered on Sunday. Things changed in 2012, when the USPS signed a contract with Amazon to cover Sunday deliveries. Groff’s postmaster initially didn’t schedule Groff to work on Sunday, and some of Groff’s co-workers began to complain. Rather than explain the obligations of Title VII, the postmaster buckled. When Groff failed to show up to work on the Sundays he was scheduled for, he was disciplined and eventually quit. He went to court, claiming that the refusal to accommodate him violated Title VII, the federal law prohibiting religious discrimination in the workplace. Lower courts ruled against Groff.

In a unanimous opinion authored by Justice Samuel Alito, the Supreme Court explained, “Title VII requires an employer that denies a religious accommodation to show that the burden of granting an accommodation would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business.” With a standard clearly articulated, the Court remanded the case so that Groff’s claim could be reconsidered.

The Court’s decision is not some sort of judicial overreach in favor of religious Americans, but a faithful interpretation of the law. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the federal law barring discrimination in the workplace, requires employers to accommodate an employee’s religious observance or practice unless it places “an undue hardship on the conduct of an employer’s business.” Prior to Groff, employers and lower courts mistakenly defined “undue hardship” as anything more than a de minimus expense (a term meaning so minor as to merit disregard). These courts pointed to TWA v. Hardison, a Supreme Court case from the 1970s. Many religious employees have had to choose between religious practice and keeping their jobs because of this mistake.

The Court in Groff set the record straight. Hardison, properly read, stands for the proposition that employers must accommodate religious practices unless they can show that doing so would result in substantial increased costs in relation to the conduct of its particular business. This, the Court explained, is also consistent with the meaning of “undue hardship” in ordinary speech.

The Court also addressed some “recurring issues” in its opinion that are increasingly becoming a concern in today’s workforce and might have been some of the reasons why Groff’s scheduling requests were denied. “Impacts on coworkers are relevant only to the extent those impacts go on to affect the conduct of the business,” explained the Court. Animosity to a particular religion or even to religion in general “cannot be considered ‘undue.’” 

America’s workforce reflects society. Both have become less and less “religious” since Title VII was passed. This is all the more reason why Title VII’s prohibition against religious discrimination and the duty to accommodate religious practice are needed — and the Court’s unanimous vindication of these rights is all the sweeter.