Q. We have possessions we no longer need. Is it morally permissible for me to sell items directly on online platforms that support abortion, or would that be sinful moral cooperation? If I sell themto a third party knowing they will likely be resold on such platforms, am I morally responsible? Would it be better to discard them rather than risk even indirect cooperation? —B., Nebraska

 

A. Many of the questions we consider in this column concern what you have rightly referred to as “moral cooperation” in the wrongdoing of others. Cooperation occurs when one’s own action contributes in some way to the wrongful actions of another.

It should be noted that if you had a reasonable, morally unobjectionable alternative for disposing of your possessions — such as donating to acceptable charities, selling locally, or using platforms with fewer or less serious moral problems — you ordinarily would be obliged to choose that option. However, your circumstances do not appear to offer such an alternative.

Formal and Material Cooperation

In evaluating questions of moral cooperation, it is essential first to distinguish between formal and material cooperation in another’s wrongdoing. Formal cooperation occurs when one shares in the wrongful intention of the evildoer.

In your case, this would arise if you intended that the selling platform use the revenue generated by your participation to support abortion — that is, if you selected the platform, at least in part, because of its abortion advocacy. Formal cooperation is always morally wrong, since one’s own intention aligns with and endorses the evil intention of another.

Material cooperation, by contrast, occurs when one’s action contributes to another’s wrongdoing without sharing in the other’s wrongful intention. One’s contribution is foreseen and tolerated only as a side effect of pursuing some other good.

Why Understanding Material Cooperation Matters

Nearly everyone contributes, in limited and unintended ways, to wrongdoing through ordinary activities — such as paying our federal income tax — that cannot reasonably be avoided without neglecting legitimate responsibilities. Learning how to assess material cooperation enables people to evaluate their reasons for acting, recognize and assess unintended harmful effects, and judge prudently whether those effects may reasonably be accepted.

Why This Case Does Not Involve Formal Cooperation

Since, as the seller, you intend to dispose of your goods in a morally responsible manner and have no interest in — no intention of — supporting the platform’s advocacy of abortion, you would not be formally cooperating in the evil of abortion by selling your goods through the platform.

Three Conditions for Morally Permissible Material Cooperation

We are left, then, with the question of material cooperation. Material cooperation can be morally acceptable, but only if three conditions are met: The act you yourself choose must be good or morally neutral in itself; your reasons for acting must be morally sound; and there must be a proportionate reason for acting.

First, the act must be good or morally neutral in itself. In your case, you are selling usable goods, and — assuming the items are not themselves wrongful to sell, such as pirated media, pornographic materials or state secrets — the act of selling them is at least morally neutral.

Second, the reasons for acting must be morally acceptable. In your case, you intend to pass on useful items to others who may benefit from them, and in so doing engage in responsible stewardship of your resources. These are plainly legitimate reasons.

Third, the reasons for acting must be proportionate to the reasons for refraining from the action. Another way to say this is the reasons for cooperating must be stronger or at least as strong as the reasons for not cooperating. It is important to see that the reasons for not cooperating are grounded in the bad side effects of contributing to another’s wrongdoing — just as the reasons for cooperating are grounded in the bad side effects of forgoing cooperation.

Evaluating Proportionate Reasons: Primary and Secondary Bad Side Effects

To assess whether we have a proportionate reason to materially cooperate, we need first to consider the primary bad side effects of materially cooperating — namely, the indirect contribution to the cause of abortion.

What is the magnitude of your contribution to the evil of abortion and the likelihood that refraining from selling on these platforms would actually impede the wrongdoing in question?

In most cases, when personal items are sold through large online platforms, the seller’s financial contribution to the platform is minimal. Although a small portion of the platform’s revenue may be used to support immoral activities, it is highly unlikely that your contribution would enable any specific act of abortion that would not otherwise occur or meaningfully increase demand for abortion. In other words, refraining from selling items is very unlikely to reduce or prevent the immoral activities the platform supports.

Because your contribution would be minimal and indirect, the primary bad side effects, though real, appear negligible. Moreover, selling through such a platform would advance other legitimate goods. Therefore, these bad side effects do not constitute a decisive reason to refrain from using the platform.

Not only must we consider the primary bad side effects, but also secondary bad effects that can accompany material cooperation. These include the risk of growing morally desensitized to the evil of abortion by becoming habituated to such arrangements, the impact on one’s ability to bear credible witness against injustice, and the possibility of causing confusion or scandal among others.

However, assuming your use of these selling platforms is a one-time or infrequent occurrence, does not draw you into ongoing relationships of trust or interdependence with abortion advocates, and is unlikely to be noticed by others in a way that misrepresents your moral commitments or causes confusion or scandal, the risks of these harmful secondary bad effects appear remote.

Finally, a sound judgment must also consider alternatives. As I said above, when morally unproblematic options are available and are less burdensome, we ought to adopt them.

Selling to a Third Party

You asked about selling items to a third party, such as a reseller, suspecting that the reseller will use morally problematic platforms to sell them. In this case, your cooperation seems even less problematic.

The responsibility for choosing a particular platform rests with the reseller, who makes his decision as part of his own plan of action. If you were certain that his reselling to a tainted platform was an act of formal cooperation, then your assessment of your own material cooperation with the reseller would be similar to what it would be if you sold directly to the tainted platform, since your reseller’s acts would likewise be immoral. 

But I presume that you do not know whether the reseller is formally cooperating with the abortion-endorsing platform. And if his cooperation is only material, you ordinarily cannot assess for him whether his act of selling to a tainted platform would violate principles of licit material cooperation. If the intentions of those with whom you interact are ambiguous, and if that ambiguity cannot be easily dispelled, you should not take responsibility for the downstream choices of the reseller.

Why Discarding Usable Goods Is Not Morally Required

Finally, you ask whether, to avoid any risk of inappropriate cooperation, it might be morally preferable to discard the items that cannot be donated. I would strongly caution against this conclusion. As explained above, avoiding all material cooperation with wrongdoing is often impossible and sometimes unreasonable.

Discarding usable goods can itself be morally problematic, as it wastes resources and forgoes opportunities to pass them on to people who might genuinely benefit. Moral integrity does not require avoiding every remote connection to wrongdoing, but rather choosing reasonably in complex circumstances while firmly opposing injustice in intention and witness.

Prudence, Responsibility and Moral Integrity in Practice

Ultimately, the evaluation of material cooperation in cases like these is a matter of prudential judgment. 

Prudence does not consist in calculating goods and evils by a numerical scale — as proportionalists believe — but in reasonably assessing which course of action better respects the full range of human goods at stake. It requires honesty about one’s intentions, attentiveness to alternatives, and resistance to self-deception.